Every dollar we spend on school security is pointed at the children. The cameras watch them. The scanners screen them. The drills train them. The monitoring software reads what they type. We have built an entire industry around the premise that the danger walks in through the front door wearing a backpack.
On September 1 in Buckeye, Arizona, the threat was already inside, holding a staff badge.
Police received a tip about a school shooting threat posted to Instagram. They traced it to Westpark Elementary School, and to a 21 year old paraprofessional who, according to police, made the post while she was at the school. She was arrested that evening. Court documents say she admitted making the post and acknowledged the seriousness of what she had done. Police said there was no ongoing threat to the campus. She faces charges of threats and interfering with an educational institution, and is due back in court on September 17.
I am not going to name her, and I want to explain why before I go further. She has been charged, not convicted. More importantly, this piece is not about one young woman in Arizona. It is about a hole in how we do this work, and her name does not make that hole any bigger or smaller.
A person saw something and told someone. Police traced it within hours and arrested her the same evening. No child was harmed.
Notice what did not solve this. No AI camera caught it. No weapons scanner caught it. No million dollar system flagged anything, because the threat was a post on a phone, not a shape in a hallway. A human being noticed, and a human being spoke up. That is the same finding the Secret Service has published over and over, and we keep buying hardware anyway.
Here is the question I have not been able to shake since I read this story.
If a 14 year old at that school had posted the same thing, we know exactly what would have happened. A behavioral threat assessment team would have convened. Someone would have been assigned to interview him. He would have been given a risk level. There would have been a safety plan, a parent conference, a counselor, a check in schedule, and a written record. Whatever you think about how well schools do that work, the machinery exists and it is aimed at students.
For a 21 year old on the payroll, there is no machinery at all. There was a background check, once, before she was hired. And then nothing, for as long as she worked there.
That is the gap. We assess students continuously and we screen adults once.
This is the part that districts do not want to hear, so let me be blunt about it.
A background check is a backward looking document. It asks what have you done. Behavioral threat assessment is a forward looking process. It asks are you on a pathway to harming someone. Those are completely different questions, and we have systematically assigned the weaker one to the adults who have keys to the building.
A background check on a 21 year old with no record comes back clean, because it should. It would have told the district nothing about what she would post six months later. It is not designed to. Yet in most districts it is the entire adult safety program, and once it clears, the file closes.
Some states have started fixing the smaller half of this. Ohio's Rapback system notifies the state immediately when an enrolled employee is arrested anywhere in the state, and by 2026 it covers bus drivers and contractors too. Florida requires rescreening every five years. Pennsylvania requires an employment history review designed to stop districts from quietly passing along an employee with a history of misconduct. Those are real improvements and every state should have them.
But notice that all of them still only catch adults who have already done something. None of them ask the question that actually prevents violence.
I wrote recently about how many teachers and staff are being assaulted at work, and how little we do about it. This is the same neglect from a different angle.
School employees are exhausted, underpaid, and frequently very young. A paraprofessional is often a 20 something making close to nothing, handling the hardest behavioral cases in the building, with minimal training and almost no support. We have spent years, correctly, building out mental health services for students. Ask your district what exists for the adults. In most places the honest answer is an insurance card and a phone number nobody has called.
I am not offering anyone an excuse. Posting a school shooting threat is a serious crime and the arrest was appropriate. But if the only intervention available for a struggling adult in a school building is handcuffs, then we have no prevention program for adults at all. We have a punishment program that activates after the threat is already public.
That is the definition of reactive, and I have spent 8 years arguing that reactive is how we got here.
I am not saying school staff are dangerous. The overwhelming majority of the adults in our schools are the reason children are safe, and many of them would put their bodies between a shooter and your kid without hesitating. I have met hundreds of them.
I am not calling for surveillance of teachers, or for treating every frustrated employee as a suspect. That would poison the trust these buildings run on and it would not make anyone safer.
What I am saying is narrower and harder to argue with. If your threat assessment policy only contemplates students, it has a hole in it. Adults work in the building too. They can be in crisis too. And the plan for when they are should not be a 911 call.
Ask your district two questions and make them answer in writing. One: does our behavioral threat assessment policy apply to employees, or only to students? Read the actual policy, because most say students. Two: after the day we hire someone, what happens next? Are we enrolled in continuous arrest notification, or do we simply never look again? Then ask the harder one. What does a staff member in crisis actually do at 2 p.m. on a Tuesday, and does anybody in this building know the answer?
We spent a generation teaching children to say something when they see something. In Buckeye, somebody did, and it worked. The question we have avoided is what we are prepared to do when the person they are worried about has a staff badge and a key.
For Alex. And for all of them.
Max Schachter
The employee described has been charged, not convicted, and is not named here. Learn more about school safety at schoolsafetydashboard.org.