Police in Bend, Oregon, arrived at Silver Rail Elementary 3 minutes after the first 911 call.

That is about as fast as a police response gets anywhere in this country.

It was not fast enough. By then, 3 children and a teacher had been killed.

On Thursday, October 15, a 16-year-old former student climbed the school fence, walked to an outside set of double doors and found them locked. So he fired into the glass, stepped through, and walked into the first classroom inside the entrance. It was a special needs classroom.

Rhoam Summer was 5. Megan Lambert was 25, a teacher her family says was working her dream job and "always fought for the underdog." 2 boys, ages 8 and 11, were also killed. Their families have asked that their names stay private. A 7-year-old girl and teacher Becky Drury were wounded.

It could have been worse. A teacher threw her phone at the gunman and tackled him. A father with 2 daughters at the school followed him inside and stopped him. His family says he does not want recognition, so I will not name him here. They have my gratitude.

In the days ahead, most of the conversation will be about the shooter, the gun and the heroes. I want to talk about the glass. Because the door was locked, and it still was not enough.

Same weak point, different schools

I have spent 8 years studying how these attacks unfold. Glass keeps showing up.

4 schools, 1 weak point

How attackers got past a locked or closed door.

2012Sandy Hook Elementary, ConnecticutFront entrance doors were locked. He shot through a glass panel beside them.26 killed
2018Marjory Stoneman Douglas High, FloridaHe never entered a classroom. Every shot into a classroom went through the door or its window.17 killed
2023The Covenant School, TennesseeHe shot through the glass doors to get inside.6 killed
2026Silver Rail Elementary, OregonOutside doors were locked. He fired through the glass panes and entered.4 killed

Sources: Connecticut State's Attorney (2013); MSD Public Safety Commission report (2019), p. 24; Metro Nashville Police; Bend Police Department

Parkland is personal. The commission that investigated the shooting found that the gunman "never entered a single classroom" in Building 12, where my son Alex was killed. Every shot into a classroom was fired through the door or the window in the door.

The commission also found something that has stayed with me. A hard corner is the part of a classroom you cannot see or reach from the door window. "If you went into that classroom and you took a hard left into a hard corner, you were going to be safe," the commission's chair, Pinellas County Sheriff Bob Gualtieri, said. Only 2 of the school's 30 classrooms had a marked hard corner.

The door was locked. The glass was not.

What the new research shows

This spring, the ALERRT Center at Texas State University, which trains police across the country to respond to active shooters, published the most detailed study I have seen on doors in school shootings. It looked at 54 school attacks from 2000 to 2025 and tracked every door the attackers touched.

Most of the time, attackers got in because the door was not locked. That is the first lesson, and it is the easiest one to fix. But when a door was locked and an attacker still got through, it was the glass that gave way.

How attackers got through the door

29 doors that attackers entered in 54 school shootings, 2000 to 2025.

Door was unlocked16
Locked, shot through the glass6
Propped open or unsecured4
Unknown3

Source: ALERRT Center, Texas State University, with the Security Industry Association, The Role of Locked Doors and Access Control in School-Based Active Shooter Events (2026)

Attackers tried to force their way through a locked door 9 times. They succeeded 6 times. Every one of those 6 went through glass. The study found no case where an attacker got through a solid door with a working lock.

The researchers put it in 7 words: "Glass is the primary point of mechanical failure."

And locking still matters enormously. Behind locked or barricaded doors, someone was hurt about 1 time in 6. Behind unlocked doors, it was 1 time in 2.

Did anyone get hurt behind the door?

Share of doors in the study where at least 1 person behind it was shot.

Unlocked doors50% (10 of 20)
Locked or barricaded17% (3 of 18)

Source: ALERRT Center and Security Industry Association (2026). Small sample; the researchers note it should be read with caution.

One more finding matters for parents of young children. In every elementary school attack in the study, the attacker came from outside the building. At an elementary school, the outside doors and the glass in them are the front line.

Every layer has a job

School security works in layers. Each one is meant to slow an attacker down and buy the seconds that let teachers lock down and police arrive. Here is how those layers lined up in Bend.

The layers between an attacker and a classroom

What each layer is for, and what happened at Silver Rail Elementary.

  1. 01Perimeter fenceSlows and channels anyone approaching. In Bend: he threw the gun over and climbed.
  2. 02Exterior doors and glassKeeps an attacker outside. In Bend: the doors were locked. He fired through the glass panes.
  3. 03Distance to classroomsGives teachers time to lock down. In Bend: the classroom was just inside the entrance.
  4. 04Classroom doorA locked solid door has never been breached in the study's 25 years of data. Its glass panel is the weak spot.
  5. 05Hard cornerThe last layer. A marked spot out of view of the door window.

Sources: Bend Police Department timeline; ALERRT Center and SIA (2026); MSD Public Safety Commission (2019)

I want to be fair to Bend-La Pine Schools. This is a district that invested in security. By 2024, local reporting showed every school had a secure vestibule entrance, and the district was replacing locks on about 3,200 doorways. We do not yet know which doors he came through or what kind of glass was in them. Investigators will tell us.

What we do know is that a locked door bought very little time. And when the first classroom sits right inside the entrance, there is very little time to lose.

An empty elementary school hallway with a classroom door and its narrow glass window, morning light
The narrow window in a classroom door lets teachers see the hallway. It is also the most common way an attacker sees, and shoots, into the room.

What glass can't do

Glass upgrades are not a cure. Most security film delays an attacker. It does not stop bullets, and any product sold as "bulletproof film" should make you suspicious. A strong pane in a weak frame still fails. And no glass helps when the attacker is already a student inside the building, which was true for 2 out of every 3 attackers in the study.

That is why prevention still comes first: threat assessment, anonymous reporting, and adults who notice. Glass is one layer. It happens to be the layer that keeps failing.

3 min Police response in Bend. It still was not fast enough.
6 of 6 Successful breaches of locked doors went through glass
2 of 30 MSD classrooms with a marked hard corner in 2018

What actually works

Walk the building and count the glass. List every exterior door with glass in or beside it, and every classroom door with a window. Start with the main entrance and any outside door that opens near a classroom. That is where Bend happened.

Upgrade with tested systems. There is now a standard built for exactly this. ASTM F3561 tests the whole assembly, the glass, the frame and the hardware, after simulated gunfire, then measures how well it resists someone trying to force through. Ask any vendor for independent test results on the full system, not just the film.

Lock every classroom door, every time. Doors that lock from the inside, without stepping into the hallway, are the single best tool we have. The 2027 International Building Code will require them in schools.

Cover the door window and mark the hard corner. The Parkland commission told every Florida district to give teachers a quick way to cover door windows and to mark a hard corner in every classroom. It costs almost nothing. Every school in America can do it this month.

One thing to do this week

If you are a parent, ask your principal 2 questions: "Which outside doors at my child's school have glass, and has that glass been assessed?" and "Does my child's classroom have a door that locks from the inside and a marked hard corner?" If you are a teacher, stand outside your classroom door tonight and look in through the window. Every spot you can see is a spot an attacker can see. Find the part of the room you cannot see, clear it, and make sure every student knows to go there.

Check your child's school

See the safety picture for your district. Our School Safety Dashboard shows the safety incidents your district officially reported, how they have changed over time, and how your district compares with the state average.

  1. Open the dashboard and search for your school or district.
  2. Go to Safety Incidents. You'll see every incident type the district reported, from threats to weapons.
  3. Click any incident type to see this year's count, the change from last year, and the trend against the state average.
Best on a computer for now. We're building a new, phone-friendly version that will make this even easier.
Look up your school

For Alex. And for all of them.

Max Schachter

If someone needs help

If a child or adult is struggling after this news: call or text 988, the Suicide and Crisis Lifeline.

Talking with kids about school shootings: National Association of School Psychologists guide

Anonymous tips for students and adults: Sandy Hook Promise Say Something, 1-844-572-9669

Immediate danger: call 911.

Sources: CBS News, 3 children, 1 teacher killed in shooting at Bend, Oregon, elementary school. KPTV, Bend police name victims in Silver Rail school shooting. ABC News, What we know about the victims in the Bend, Oregon, elementary school shooting. ALERRT Center and Security Industry Association, The Role of Locked Doors and Access Control in School-Based Active Shooter Events (2026). Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission, Initial Report (January 2019). Local 10, Photos inside MSD classrooms show pre-existing safety problems, commission says. Connecticut Division of Criminal Justice, Report of the State's Attorney on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School (2013). AIA, ASTM F3561, a new way to evaluate forced entry resistance. The Bulletin, Central Oregon schools have new secure entrances, doors and locks (2024).

Data: ALERRT Center at Texas State University, the Security Industry Association, the MSD Public Safety Commission and the Bend Police Department. Learn more at schoolsafetydashboard.org.